President Ronald Reagan - Executive Summary of Danilo Blandon lyrics

Oscar Danilo Blandon, a member of a prominent family in Nicaragua, fled to the United States soon after the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua in 1979. In the early 1980s, while living in Los Angeles, Blandon began distributing c**aine, originally at the behest of Norwin Meneses to support the Contra movement. Shortly after he began dealing d**, Blandon began selling large quantities of c**aine on his own for his personal profit. By his own admission, he became a significant drug dealer, receiving c**aine from Colombian, Mexican, and Nicaraguan sources, and selling it to Ricky Ross and others in Los Angeles and elsewhere. In 1986, Blandon's drug trafficking activities became the focus of criminal investigations in Los Angeles by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), the DEA, and the FBI. In October 1986, with the help of the FBI and DEA, the LASD obtained search warrants for more than a dozen locations connected to Blandon's drug organization. When the search warrants were executed, however, the LASD found only a negligible quantity of d** at Blandon's residence. The Mercury News articles raised various allegations about why the LASD raids failed, including the suggestion that the federal authorities may have impeded the LASD investigation or that the Blandon organization may have been tipped off about the search warrants by the CIA or federal law enforcement authorities. This speculation was largely fueled by statements made by Ronald Lister, who told the LASD deputies who searched his home during the raid about his alleged CIA connections and suggested that his activities were protected by that agency. In addition, the newspaper articles claimed that the federal authorities seized the evidence collected by the LASD during its raids and requested that drug possession charges against Blandon be dropped. Our review did not substantiate these claims. The FBI and DEA investigators did ask the LASD to delay the execution of the search warrants while they pursued their investigation of Blandon, a position that was justified in retrospect. However, once the LASD indicated its intent to go forward with the searches, the FBI and DEA fully cooperated with the LASD, even providing information that became part of the basis for the LASD affidavit in support of the search warrants. We found no evidence that the failure of the LASD investigation was the result of its being compromised by the CIA or any other federal authorities. Blandon changed his operations before the raids occurred because he correctly believed he was under surveillance. We found no evidence to suggest that any government officials told him about the surveillance or the search warrants in advance. We also concluded that Lister and others made statements at the time of the raids about alleged connections to the CIA because they apparently thought such claims would be helpful rather than because they were true. In any event, we found no evidence that the investigators changed any of their actions because of these unsubstantiated claims. Charges against Blandon were dropped because of the small amount of c**aine found at his home and because of the federal agents' plans to pursue a larger case against the Blandon organization. In fact, three months later, in January 1987, the FBI, DEA, and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in coordination with the Los Angeles U.S. Attorney's Office, opened a federal Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) case targeting Blandon and his a**ociates. This investigation was unsuccessful and was closed in the summer of 1987 for several reasons, none of which related to the CIA or the Contras. We concluded there were insufficient law enforcement resources a**igned to the OCDETF investigation for them to investigate Blandon's organization effectively. Second, Blandon apparently stopped his drug trafficking activities after the unsuccessful LASD raid on his home and moved to Florida. Finally, there were problems of coordination among the various law enforcement entities involved in the case, particularly between the DEA and FBI regarding whether Meneses should be used as an informant against Blandon or should be a target of the investigation. We found no evidence that Blandon and Meneses were protected by any intelligence agency or received any benefits because of their connection to the Contras or any alleged connection to the CIA. Blandon eventually returned to Southern California in 1990 and continued drug dealing there. In 1990, another federal OCDETF investigation was opened against Blandon in San Diego, eventually resulting in a 1992 indictment against him for conspiracy to possess c**aine with intent to distribute it. After Blandon's arrest, he agreed to cooperate with the government in return for a reduced sentence. Blandon was eventually sentenced to 48 months in prison, based on his substantial cooperation against drug traffickers. The government later filed a motion seeking a further reduction in Blandon's sentence, based on his cooperation, and the court reduced Blandon's sentence to 28 months. The Mercury News articles suggested that Blandon was given an inappropriately lenient sentence after his 1992 conviction, despite his "admi[ssion] to crimes that have sent others away for life." We found that Blandon clearly received a considerable degree of leniency, at the behest of the government, based on his substantial cooperation. Whether the government should have given more consideration to Blandon's prior criminal history before providing him the substantial sentence reduction, or whether his sentence was appropriate given the extent of his cooperation, is part of a broader debate about the leniency with which the government treats certain valuable cooperating witnesses and informants that extends far beyond the context of this case. In our review, we found no indication that the government's actions were based on anything other than its a**essment of Blandon's cooperation. We also found no evidence that Blandon received any special consideration because of any alleged affiliation with the Contras or the CIA. The OIG concluded that Blandon improperly received a "green card" -- legal permanent residence (LPR) status in the United States. After Blandon's release from prison in 1994, the INS agent a**igned to the OCDETF investigation was given responsibility for obtaining the necessary travel documents so that Blandon could travel to work undercover for the DEA. Rather than pursue various avenues that would have allowed Blandon to stay in the country while he worked for the DEA, the INS agent arranged for Blandon to obtain a green card from an INS immigration examiner. Blandon was not eligible for a green card because of his 1992 felony drug trafficking conviction. Although recollections differ on what the INS agent told his supervisors or the immigration examiner who approved the green card concerning Blandon's prior criminal conviction, we concluded that the INS agent knew or should have known that Blandon was not eligible for the green card, and that the agent withheld the fact of Blandon's conviction from the immigration examiner. We concluded that the INS agent took the actions he did because he did not want to expend the additional effort necessary to obtain the travel documents the appropriate way, rather than because of any alleged connection between Blandon and the Contras or the CIA.