Joint Chiefs of Staff - Report By The Department Of Defense And Joint Chiefs Of Staff Representative On The Caribbean Survey Group lyrics

REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP to the JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF on CUBA PROJECT (TS) The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter by 13 March 1962. JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS) THE PROBLEM 1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba. FACTS HEARING ON THE PROBLEM 2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action. 3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generating instances in the Guantanamo area. 4. For additional facts see Enclosure B. DISCUSSION 5. The suggested courses of actions appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that US military intervention will result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, an as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere. 6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonably certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time frame of the next few months. CONCLUSION 7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However, these suggestions should be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba. RECOMMENDATIONS 8. It is recommended that: a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project. b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands. c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers a**igned to NATO activities d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff ___________________ *Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: “Operation MONGOOSE”, dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office. **Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: “Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)” dated 8 March 1962 on file in General Craig's office.